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THE COMPATIBILITY OF PATENT LAW AND
THE INTERNET
Jeanne C. Fromer*
Much ink has been spilled and many bits have been used discussing what
the Internet's architecture and values ought to mean for the future of
copyright law.' And though much has been written about the patentability
of software, 2 how, if at all, patent law and the Internet's values are
compatible is undertheorized. 3 Through the lens of recent books by
Jonathan Zittrain, The Future of the Internet-And How To Stop It,4 and
David Post, In Search of Jefferson's Moose: Notes on the State of
Cyberspace,5 I explore this issue. Although a central value of the Internet
is inclusiveness and the patent right is directed to exclusivity, I suggest that
if tailored appropriately, patent law can be supportive of the Internet's core
values.
Part I discusses theories of the Internet, as put forth in the books by
Zittrain and Post. Part II turns to the patent system. Part III weaves
together the two topics to explore the compatibility of patent law and the
Internet.
I. THE INTERNET

Jonathan Zittrain tells an engaging story in his book of how computers
and the Internet came to be and what they might one day become. He
suggests that the source of that which we value in software and the
Internet-its generativity-can also be cause for the Internet's failure. 6 He
coins and defines "generativity" to mean "a system's capacity to produce
* Associate Professor, Fordham Law School. I thank Amaud Ajdler, Sonia Katyal, and the
participants in this Symposium for their helpful comments.
1. E.g., YOCHAI BENKLER, THE WEALTH OF NETWORKS: How SOCIAL PRODUCTION
TRANSFORMS MARKETS AND FREEDOM (2006); LAWRENCE LESSIG, FREE CULTURE: THE
NATURE AND FUTURE OF CREATIVITY (2005); JESSICA LITMAN, DIGITAL COPYRIGHT (2006);

Jane C. Ginsburg, "The Exclusive Right to Their Writings ": Copyright and Control in the
DigitalAge, 54 ME. L. REV. 195 (2002); Mark A. Lemley & R. Anthony Reese, Reducing
Digital Copyright Infringement Without Restricting innovation, 56 STAN. L. REV. 1345
(2004).

2. Infra sources cited in Part III.
3. One notable exception is BENKLER, supra note 1, which tends to be critical of strong
patent laws in the face of information production.
4. JONATHAN ZiTTRAIN, THE FUTURE OF THE INTERNET-AND How To STOP IT (2008).
5. DAVID G. POST, IN SEARCH OF JEFFERSON'S MOOSE:

CYBERSPACE (2009).
6. ZIT-TRAtN, supra note 4, at 1-5.
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unanticipated change through unfiltered contributions from broad and
varied audiences."' 7 Zittrain associates five factors with generativity:
(1) how extensively a system or technology leverages a set of possible
tasks; (2) how well it can be adapted to a range of tasks; (3) how easily
new contributors can master it; (4) how accessible it is to those ready and
able to build on it; and (5) how transferable any changes are to others. 8
The same generativity, then, that yields for so many the Internet's pleasures
of, say, Google Earth, digital music and television episodes on demand, and
Wikipedia, also enables hackers to steal these same people's credit cards or
other personal details, crash their software, and bring down networks.
After colorfully laying out the history of computing and the Internet and
how generativity is central to the success of each, 9 Zittrain dedicates the last
third of his book to exploring the "How To Stop It" segment of the book's
title. What seems to animate Zittrain's proposed solutions is his desire to
preserve and foster good generativity, while quashing the bad kind. He is
worried about a future in which the good generativity is stamped out along
with the bad, with companies providing tethered-but safe-information
appliances designed with firmware or software to perform only particular
specified functions (such as a digital music player, a GPS system, and even
a digital toaster). Tethered appliances, according to Zittrain, would perform
their specified function well but would not be generative principally
because they would not be adaptable to other tasks and would not easily be
built upon.' 0 That is, the music player would not make toast, nor would the
toaster be able to give GPS-based directions or be built to toast bread in
some new way. General-purpose computers could in theory do all three
tasks and then some. In light of general-purpose computers' generativity,
Zittrain seeks to offer another way to the future. For example, he suggests
that general-purpose computers might have a safe "green" zone to store
important data and trustworthy software and a more risky "red" zone on
which to experiment with other software."1
According to his proposal,
some "red" zone software might turn out to be harmful but removable
before damaging anything in the "green" zone, while some might become
reliable and beneficial enough for subsequent inclusion in the "green"
zone. 12 Most centrally, Zittrain suggests that Internet users need to be
provided with more and better information about which Internet
applications and sites are reliable to use without infecting the user's
computer with a virus or hacking the user's data.13

7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.

Id. at 70 (emphasis omitted).
Id. at 71.
Id. at 7-148.
Id. at 101-03.
Id. at 154-57.
Id.
Id. at 157-62.
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David Post takes a different tack than Zittrain. He writes about the
Internet's development in the context of Thomas Jefferson's experiences
and thoughts, which at first glance seems near-Mesozoic compared with the
contemporary fast-paced growth of the Internet.
Post nonetheless
establishes the analogy's fit, suggesting that Jefferson's animating
republican beliefs-a penchant for self-governing, but interlinked,
communities, rather than strong, centralized government-is precisely what
has made the Internet such a success thus far and ought to be preserved. As
one of many examples of Jefferson's republicanism, Post points to
Jefferson's approach to the over 800,000 square miles of land acquired in
the Louisiana Purchase: let subterritories within the purchase govern
themselves, with the power to petition to become states of the United States
down the line. 14 As Jefferson explained, "I have much confidence that we
shall proceed successfully for ages to come, and that ... it will be seen that
the larger the extent of country, the more firm its republican structure,
if
15
founded, not on conquest, but in principles of compact and equality."
Post applies these Jeffersonian principles to the story of the Internet's
development, indicating how time and time again, the Internet was
structured in a decentralized fashion, which allowed for its exponential
growth. For example, Post describes the Internet protocol for transferring
data over the Internet, TCP/IP. 16 In simplified form, TCP/IP works to
transport raw data from users' applications (such as e-mail programs or
Web browsers) to their destination. The protocol does not concern itself
with what the data represent-be they part of a text message, a picture,
sound, or something else-but just carries the bits associated with a
particular application. In that sense, TCP/IP is decentralized because it
allows for any sort of application--even those developed after the
protocol's development-to link up to it for sending data because the
17
protocol does not need to know what the data mean.
This protocol is essential to the Internet's notion of end-to-end
computing, by which, according to Post, the processing of data through
varied applications happens at the endpoints of the Internet-the users'
computers-while the shuffling around of uncomprehended bits happens
over the network. As Post puts it,
Smart machines, connected to a dumb network. Complicated and
sophisticated applications, and a network doing nothing more than
moving bits around as directed by those applications. That's the Internet.
All the interesting stuff is at the edges-the network just gets the bits
there, as quickly and efficiently as possible.18
14. POST, supra note 5, at 115-16.
15. Id. (emphasis omitted) (quoting Jefferson).

16. Id. at 25.
Protocol. Id.

17. Id. at 80-83.
18. Id. at 86.

TCP/IP stands for Transmission Communication Protocol/Internet
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To Post, the Internet-as grounded in end-to-end computing-is very much
like Jefferson's notion of a loosely linked community, with self-governing
subgroups.
Both Zittrain's and Post's books hold out the wondrous promise of the
Internet as a tool of communication, knowledge, computation, scientific
research, self-governance transcending our physical governmental
boundaries, and future applications we cannot begin to imagine today.
Each book focuses in great detail on how the Internet came to be and its
vision of the guiding principles for the Internet going forward. Zittrain
emphasizes generativity as a key aspect of the Internet worth preserving,
while Post highlights the Internet's decentralized and self-governing
aspects.
Each book dedicates a small amount of attention to an essential legal
issue affecting the Internet's future, namely, the patent protections available
to cover varying aspects of that technology. Depending on how the patent
laws are structured, they might grant incentives to innovate with regard to
the Internet (if the protections are structured just right), stifle innovation in
the area (if the protections are granted too easily or not easily enough), or
some mixture of both (if the protections accord just the right incentive to
some subsets of innovation in the area, but not to others).
Zittrain sets out two competing types of software production: proprietary
software, which is often protected by patents, and open-source software,
which is not. 19 He relays the concern that, for the former class of software
production, perhaps too many software patents issue, and to large firms at
that, for the purpose of "extract[ing] royalties from rivals and to defend
themselves from their rivals' patents," thereby causing the unfortunate
situation of a patent thicket. 20 He expresses worry at this situation for
numerous reasons: smaller firms and individuals may not be included in
cross-licensing if they do not also have software patents, and infringement
can occur even if the software developer did not know of the patented
invention and even if the patented invention's specific code is not used, so
long as the same abstract concepts are present in each. 2 1 Zittrain suggests
that this situation might not be so bad so long as many actual instances of
patent infringement-which he thinks will occur quite often-are
tolerated. 22 In addition, he proposes that more infringing uses (or close
questions of such) be tolerated by making it harder for patentees to sue for

19. Z]TrRAIN, supra note 4, at 189.
20. Id. at 190 (citing James Bessen & Robert M. Hunt, The Software Patent Experiment,
14-15
(Research
on
Innovation
Working
Paper,
2004),
available
at

http://www.researchoninnovation.org/softpat.pdf).
21. Id.
22. Id. at 190-91.
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infringement, in part by modifying
the statute of limitations and by
23
reinvigorating the doctrine of laches.
Post has a different take on the role of patent law in the Internet's
development. He focuses on Jefferson's central role in American patent
law, as author of the first national patent law, first Commissioner of Patents,
and inventor of such varied items as a weather vane, folding chair,
automated calendar, and plow. 24 Post relays Jefferson's skepticism about
strong patent protection:
That ideas should freely spread from one to another over the globe seems
to have been peculiarly and benevolently designed by nature when she
made them, like the air we breathe, incapable of confinement or exclusive
appropriation, and, like fire,
expansible over all space without lessening
25
their density in any point.
Post recognizes that intellectual property protection is about trade-offs
between the benefits the protection can bring, in the form of increased
innovation, and the costs the protection imposes on society, in terms of
higher costs and decreased competition. 26 Like Jefferson, Post is skeptical
about many patent grants, in that people often feel the need to create
27
valuable inventions regardless of the availability of patent protection.
Post indicates, without much more detail, that patent law ought to be about
drawing the line so that the benefits of patent protection outweigh the
costs. 28 He speculates that so much Internet-related innovation, such as
29
open-source software, happened without intellectual property protection,
intimating that the law ought to be cautious and not make patent protection
for Intemet-related innovation too strong.
Zittrain and Post, then, both appear to be skeptical of applying patent law
to Internet-related innovation, even while they suggest that it might serve
some beneficial role. This essay picks up their ruminations on patent
protection for Internet-based inventions and explores whether patent law is
compatible with the Internet's central goals, as suggested by Zittrain and
Post. I conclude that they can be compatible if care is taken to tailor the
application of patent law to encourage the sort of software innovation
underlying much of the Internet's success. Before turning to that, I provide
some background on patent law in the next part.

23. Id. at 191-92.
24. POST, supra note 5, at 194-96. Other scholars suggest that Thomas Jefferson ought
not to be viewed as the central historical figure in American patent law. See, e.g., Adam
Mossoff, Who Cares What Thomas Jefferson Thought About Patents?: Reevaluating the
Patent "Privilege" in HistoricalContext, 92 CORNELL L. REv. 953 (2007).

25. POST, supra note 5, at 197 (emphasis omitted) (quoting Jefferson).
26. Id. at 198-200. Decreased competition may result in both the protected invention
and any follow-up innovation that does not occur because of the protection. Id.
27. Id. at 200.
28. Id. at 200-01.
29. Id. at 203.
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II. PATENT LAW
30
The principal goal of the U.S. patent system is to stimulate innovation,
as manifested in the Constitution's articulation of Congress's power "[t]o
promote the Progress of... useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to...

Inventors the exclusive Right to their ...Writings and Discoveries." 3 1 In

theory, this stimulation occurs by rewarding inventors with a time-limited,
exclusive patent right for taking two steps they likely would not otherwise
take: to invent in the first instance 32 and to reveal information to the public
about these inventions, 33 thereby enriching society with the invention and
34
the ability to build on the invention.
An inventor can obtain a patent so long as he demonstrates that his
invention or discovery is patentable subject matter-a "new and useful
process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and
38
37
useful improvement thereof"35-and is novel, 36 useful, and nonobvious.
Patents are granted after successfully undergoing examination by the Patent
and Trademark Office to ascertain that an invention meets patentability
conditions and its description in the patent application satisfies specified
disclosure requirements 39 of a written description, enablement, and best
mode.4 0 The written description requirement ensures that the inventor is in
possession of the claimed invention. 4 1 To enable the invention, the patent
applicant must demonstrate in the specification to "any person skilled in the
[relevant] art [how] ...to make and use the [invention]," 42 without "'undue
experimentation."' 4 3 Also, the patent applicant must set out "the best mode
contemplated by the inventor of carrying out his invention. '44 The bestmode requirement is met so long as the patent document objectively
discloses the best mode that the inventor subjectively conceived by the time
30. Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Policy Levers in Patent Law, 89 VA. L. REv. 1575,
1597-99 (2003).
31. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl.
8.
32. Burk & Lemley, supra note 30, at 1581-82 (analyzing the costs of research and
development across various industries).
33. Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 480-81 (1974) (discussing patent
law's disclosure requirements and the policy concerns motivating such requirements).
34. Jeanne C. Fromer, Patent Disclosure,94 IOWA L. REv. 539 (2009).
35. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2006).
36. Id. § 102.
37. Id. § 101.
38. Id. § 103.
39. Id. § 131.
40. Id. § 112.
41. Guang Ming Whitley, Comment, A Patent Doctrine Without Bounds: The
"Extended" Written DescriptionRequirement, 71 U. CHi. L. REv. 617, 628-29 (2004).
42. 35 U.S.C. § 112.
43. Monsanto Co. v. Syngenta Seeds, Inc., 503 F.3d 1352, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2007)
(quoting In re Wright, 999 F.2d 1557, 1561 (Fed. Cir. 1993)) (citing In re Vaeck, 947 F.2d
488, 495 (Fed. Cir. 1991); In re Wands, 858 F.2d 731,736-37 (Fed. Cir. 1988); In re Fisher,
427 F.2d 833, 839 (C.C.P.A. 1970)).
44. 35 U.S.C. § 112.
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the inventor files the patent application. 4 5 Once granted, the patent right
permits the patentee to exclude others from practicing the invention claimed
46
in his patent for a term of approximately twenty years.
Neither Congress nor the U.S. Supreme Court has issued the definitive
word on the preliminary question of whether software inventions, such as
those at the heart of the Internet's success, constitute patentable subject
matter. In 1972, in Gottschalk v. Benson,47 the Supreme Court ruled that a
method for converting binary-coded decimal numbers into pure binary
numbers is unpatentable. 48 The Court invoked its long-standing rule that
"[p]henomena of nature, though just discovered, mental processes, and
abstract intellectual concepts are not patentable, as they are the basic tools
of scientific and technological work. ' ' 4 9 The rule's asserted justification is
that certain basic building blocks of science and technology ought not to be
patentable because they are central to further innovation and ought to be
freely available. Applying this rule, the Court concluded that the method
was not patentable because it was an abstract concept as well as a basic
building block and because a patent on the method would wholly preempt
50
any use of the concept, useful only in computers.
Benson's rule led to a next wave of software patents-for inventions of
classic patentable classes of matter-most pertinently industrial processes
in which software played a role and machines containing software as an
integral part. In 1982, in Diamond v. Diehr,51 the Supreme Court approved
of the patentability of a process of the former type to calculate the optimal
time for curing rubber, using in part a computer employing Arrhenius's
equation. 52 The Court noted that the patentee was not seeking to preempt
all uses of the equation, but rather to embed the algorithm as a component
in an industrial process just to cure synthetic rubber.53 In 1996, the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit-the appellate court with exclusive
jurisdiction over almost all patent appeals54-held that software inventions
claimed as parts of a general-purpose computer constituted patentable
subject matter as well, because they produce "'a useful, concrete and
tangible result.' 5 5 The Federal Circuit revisited this decision in 2009 in In

45. Eli Lilly & Co. v. Barr Labs., Inc., 251 F.3d 955, 963 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
46. 35 U.S.C. § 154(a).
47. 409 U.S. 63 (1972).
48. Id.at 71-72.

49. Id. at 67.
50. Id. at 68-72.
51. 450 U.S. 175 (1981).
52. Id. at 187-88.

53. Id.
54. 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(1) (2006); Holmes Group, Inc. v. Vomado Air Circulation Sys.,

Inc., 535 U.S. 826, 829-30 (2002) (carving out a limited exception for cases in which the
patent issue arises only in a counterclaim).
55. State St. Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Group, Inc., 149 F.3d 1368, 1373 (Fed.
Cir. 1998) (quoting In re Alappat, 33 F.3d 1526, 1544 (Fed. Cir. 1994)).
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re Bilski,56 stating that the proper test for deciding whether a process is
patentable is based on the Supreme Court's prior case law in Benson and
Diehr, which asked whether the process is tied to a machine or "transforms
[an] article into a different state." 57 This test leaves open whether software
claimed as part of a general-purpose computer is patentable because the
court did not answer whether a general-purpose computer programmed to
run particular software is a new machine. 58 Though the Supreme Court has
granted certiorari in Bilski,59 it can decide the case without speaking to
software's patentability, as the invention at issue does not involve software.
The patentability of software running on a general-purpose computer is thus
currently up in the judicial air.
The question of whether such software inventions-often, the sort of
innovation related to the Internet--constitute patentable subject matter is
addressed to how worthwhile it is to test software inventions on an
individualized basis for novelty, nonobviousness, utility, and adequate
disclosure, rather than to make a class-based decision that almost all such
inventions would not be patentable. In the next part, I explore whether
software invention as a whole ought to be outside patentability and, if not,
whether software inventions can fulfill the other patentability criteria. I
wade into that discussion through the context of Zittrain's and Post's books.
III. THE COMPATIBILITY OF PATENT LAW AND THE INTERNET

In his book, Zittrain highlights generativity as being at the core of the
Internet's success and worries in some part that patent law's valuable
incentives to innovate may be overshadowed by extensive infringement
liabilities, impliedly impeding the Internet's generativity. Post emphasizes
decentralization and end-to-end computing as key to the Internet's success
and worries that patent law might exact too many costs to be worth its
general availability for software inventions. In so doing, each author picks
up on some significant scholarly strands on software patentability. I argue
herein that general patentability for software inventions, however, can
promote generativity and end-to-end computing, so long as the law
accounts for worries akin to those of Zittrain and Post.
Zittrain properly recognizes that the promises and dangers of the Internet
lie in its generativity. Finding solutions to prevent the dangers without
stamping out generativity is something at which he takes some honorable
stabs. One such example is the StopBadware project, started at the Harvard
University Berkman Center, which provides information to help users avoid

56. 545 F.3d 943 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (en banc), cert. granted sub nom. Bilski v. Doll, 129
S. Ct. 2735 (2009) (No. 08-964).

57. Id.
at 958-63.
58. Cf id. at 976-98 (Newman, J., dissenting) (arguing that software-implemented
processes are patentable).
59. 129 S. Ct. 2735.
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harmful software. 60 Zittrain's proffered solutions, however, seem like
preliminary thoughts requiring more robust development. This critique is in
effect not of Zittrain, but is rather a celebration of the generativity and
decentralized developments critical to the Internet's successes. That is,
perhaps the seeds of the robust solutions to the Internet's worries are being
sowed right now in varied-perhaps complementary-ways in Beijing,
Boise, and Bilbao. Certain solutions could come from a computer science
graduate student experiencing a "Eureka!" moment or from a researcher
working on a project at a large, established software company. What shape
these solutions would take cannot now be known, but it is nearly a certainty
that many attempts will come, just as Google's search engine, Wikipedia,
online shopping, and many other forms of Internet software were developed
in varied ways to create what we now consider to be the Internet. This
much can be appreciated by Post's tale of end-to-end computing, with
intelligence at the level of individual machines, which can then be
distributed all over the Internet.
Certainly only a minimal fraction of contributions will be made by wellfunded and nonprofit organizations like the Berkman Center and the
StopBadware project, which underscores how important the availability of
intellectual-property protection is. Evidence shows-as Post suggeststhat creatively inclined individuals feel compelled to create, regardless of
whether there is intellectual property protection available at the end of the
creation rainbow. 6 1 Moreover, psychologists emphasize that "[p]eople will
be most creative when they feel motivated primarily by the interest,
enjoyment, satisfaction, and challenge of the work itself-not by external
pressures. ' 62 Nonetheless, even an individual who feels compelled to
create would nearly always have insufficient time and attention to do so if
the person's work could be freely copied. Without the chance of
intellectual property protection, the creator cannot typically earn a living
being creative. Moreover, the individual's work does not publicize and
distribute itself, even in the age of the Internet. It is therefore essential that
organizations and individuals provide creators with support for professional
success by paying for, promoting, marketing, and distributing their works.
These vital institutional mechanisms will arise around creative people only
if there is a proper economic motivation for them to do so, as with the
possibility of intellectual property protection to reward successful creativity
63
by preventing copying of the protected works.
60. StopBadware, http://www.stopbadware.org (last visited Apr. 18, 2010).
61. E.g., MIHALY CSIKSZENTMHALYI, CREATIVITY: FLOW AND THE PSYCHOLOGY OF
DISCOVERY AND INVENTION 107-26 (1996) (discussing how creative people love what they
do and create for the state of flow it produces, rather than for money).

62. Beth A. Hennessey & Teresa M. Amabile, The Conditions of Creativity, in THE
NATURE OF CREATIVITY: CONTEMPORARY PSYCHOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES 11, 11 (Robert J.
Steinberg ed., 1988).

63. Cf Diane Leenheer Zimmerman, It's an Original! (?): In Pursuit of Copyright's
Elusive Essence, 28 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 187, 189-90 (2005) ("For [some], the function of
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Moreover, numerous conditions in the current software industry suggest
that patent protection would frequently be welcome and not harmful.
Despite Post's emphasis on the fact that many key aspects of the Internet's
development happened without patent seeking, the software industry has
changed since its early days. There are increasing barriers to entry, like
network effects diminishing the ease of innovation in the industry. 64
Moreover, Ronald Mann indicates that "direct evidence of high R&D
spending in the software industry undermines claims that software patents
cause firms to reduce R&D spending. ''6 5 Finally, based on extensive
interviews with those in the industry, Mann also shows that the existence of
extensive software patent portfolios in the hands of large, incumbent firms
does not significantly constrain the development of newer software firms,
as software patents can be difficult to appropriate and infringement hard to
66
detect.
The foregoing analysis suggests that preserving the potential for
generativity requires creating a legal environment that maximizes the
varieties of creativity in software contributions and contributors. I argue
that a carefully calibrated patent law is a good fit for encouraging a
considerable subset of these possible contributions.
As an initial matter, software inventions as a class ought to be considered
patentable subject matter. Software inventions fit in the mainstream of the
classes of inventions protected by patent law. 67 As Pamela Samuelson,
Randall Davis, Mitchell Kapor, and Jerry Reichman demonstrate, software
inventions are-like patentable subject matter more generally-principally
68
directed to their functionality.

the law is to structure a sector of the economy so that those who participate in the chain that
stretches from the origination to the dissemination of expressive works-be they creative or
purely informational, high authorship or low-can reap the rewards of their toil.").
64. Pamela Samuelson, Randall Davis, Mitchell D. Kapor & J.H. Reichman, A
Manifesto Concerning the Legal Protection of Computer Programs, 94 COLUM. L. REv.
2308, 2312 (1994).
65. Ronald J. Mann, Do PatentsFacilitateFinancingin the Software Industry?, 83 TEX.

L. REV. 961, 962 (2005) (disputing evidence offered by James Bessen and Robert M. Hunt in
a manuscript later published as An Empirical Look at Software Patents, 16 J. ECON. &
MGMT. STRATEGY 157, 173-74, 180-84 (2007)).
66. See id. at 962, 978-79, 999-1009.
67. See Jeanne C. Fromer, A Psychology of Intellectual Property, 104 Nw. U. L. REv.

(forthcoming 2010) (suggesting that software inventions fit more naturally in patent law,
which focuses on rewarding problem solving, than in copyright law, which focuses on
rewarding problem finding).

68. Samuelson, Davis, Kapor & Reichman, supra note 64, at 2312 (arguing, nonetheless,
against the patentability of software and in favor of sui generis protection for software to
guard against the fact that "behavior and other industrial design elements of [software]
programs are often expensive to develop and inexpensive to copy"). Samuelson et al. rightly
reject the centrality of copyright law in protecting software innovation, as copyright law is
directed to protection of expression, which software code is, but "the most important
property of programs is their behavior (i.e., the set of results brought about when program
instructions are executed)." Id. at 2314.
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John Allison, Abe Dunn, and Ronald Mann show further that a
significant number of types of software creators-such as firms making
software products as opposed to services and many start-up companieshave good cause to seek patents as a return for their functional creations.
After working through empirical data of patenting by firms in Software
Magazine's "Software 500" from 1998-2002, they suggest that "the ability
to obtain patents on software always has been important to some of the
industry incumbents, while others have exhibited little need for patents and
displayed, in some cases, strenuous opposition to the patentability of
software." 69
Their data reveal that firms offering off-the-shelf,
noncustomized software programs rely more heavily on patent protection
than do firms offering customized software services. 70 Patent protection
can be crucial for the former type of firm, as software is "often expensive to
develop and inexpensive to copy." 7 1 They explain how patents are less
important for the latter:
Patents seem likely to be a relatively more effective tool for protecting
innovation in products than in services. To the extent a firm can provide a
unique level of skilled services, it may be feasible to maintain much of the
differentiating knowledge in a tacit form, bound up with the skills of the
individual employees. Conversely, a products firm that sends its product
out into the marketplace in72 many instances will be vulnerable to
appropriation by competitors.
Patents can also be valuable for startup software companies to prevent
larger firms from copying their software and to signal to potential investors
73
that they are financially and technologically worthy of venture funding.
Relatedly, many independent inventors are poorly placed to package their
software inventions and to transact with larger incumbent firms over their
software contributions, which is in part why a number of technology

69. John R. Allison, Abe Dunn & Ronald J. Mann, Software Patents, Incumbents, and
Entry, 85 TEX. L. REv. 1579, 1580 (2007).
70. Id. at 1600-02.
71. Samuelson, Davis, Kapor & Reichman, supra note 64, at 2312.
72. Allison, Dunn & Mann, supra note 69, at 1601 (citing Mann, supra note 65, at 985;
Samuelson, Davis, Kapor & Reichman, supra note 64, at 2333-39). Allison, Dunn, and
Mann recognize the "ambiguity of causation" in the finding, in that it is unclear whether
product firms patent more frequently because they make software products or whether the
fact that they sought patents allowed them to survive as software product firms. Id. at 1603.
They also show that those areas with the fewest software firms-that is, those lacking
industry concentration-correlate significantly with propensity to patent, perhaps because it
is plausible for them to stake out their territory and repel would-be competitors. Id. at 1606
& fig.8.
73. Id. at 1609-11; Robert P. Merges, Software and Patent Scope: A Report from the
Middle Innings, 85 TEX. L. REv. 1627, 1657 (2007). These patents are, perhaps surprisingly,
not typically used in litigation against larger companies so as not to poison potential future
business associations, but instead used as bargaining chips in cross-licensing one another's
patents. Allison, Dunn & Mann, supra note 69, at 1610-11.
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licensing companies, often "labeled pejoratively as 'trolls,"' have arisen
to
74
act as middlemen between these independent inventors and large firms.
Given how significant the presence of these patent-seeking classes of
software producers are in the industry, there is a strong argument for
making available protection for at least some aspects of functionality, as
patent law does. Otherwise, these contributions might never have been
made.
Contrary to Zittrain's worries, patent availability gives small firms and
individuals a way to play in the big leagues by enabling them to secure
patents, which they could use to cross-license and gain access to all sorts of
technology developed by other entities. 75 That is, patents can give smaller
and newer software players the leverage they need to secure entr6e to
important mainstream technologies on which to build and connect. 76 Patent
law, if effectuated properly, could thus help democratize the playing field in
the software industry by minimizing barriers to entry.
Moreover, the tethered appliances Zittrain so fears are more likely to
proliferate in the absence of patent protection. In a world without patents,
firms that would otherwise prefer patenting would tend to favor tethered
appliances over general software applications, as they-and their oftspecialized hardware-would be more costly and difficult to copy or
appropriate than software executed on general-purpose computers, with its
readily available decompilers to reverse engineer software.
Nonetheless, patent protection is not necessary for all Internet software
producers. Many companies providing open-source software products, a
structure that has been politically antithetical to software patenting, have the
capability to offer services structured in such a way that patent protection is
principally inessential. 77 Allison, Dunn, and Mann explain why. They
indicate that
the commercially successful open-source programs share the salient
characteristic that they benefit from extensive financial support from large
incumbent firms [like IBM]. The firms making those investments have
done so as part of a "value-chain" strategy, in which the firms seek to
commoditize a part of a value chain in which they are unlikely to
dominate (like the operating system), hoping to extract value at some
other part of a value chain (like the servers on which the operating system
74. Allison, Dunn & Mann, supra note 69, at 1612-16 (citing John M. Golden,
Commentary, "PatentTrolls" and PatentRemedies, 85 TEX. L. REv. 2111, 2135 (2007); Joe
Beyers,

Rise

of

the

Patent

Trolls,

CNET

NEWS,

Oct.

12,

2005,

http://news.com.com/rise+of+the+patent+trolls/2010-1071_3-5892996.html).
Perhaps the
biggest concern with these companies is that they are not worried about countersuits in
infringement litigation, as they make no products, and thus the risks of bringing suit for
infringement are lower-perhaps too low-than for other software patentees. Mann, supra
note 65, at 1023.
75. Merges, supra note 73, at 1657.
76. Fromer, supra note 34, at 556-57.
77. Allison, Dunn & Mann, supra note 69, at 1611.
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runs, the middleware that runs on the stack above the operating system, or
the services 78necessary to assemble all of those pieces into a well-designed
"solution").
Moreover, many of the successful open-source finns offer customizable
software services and thus have less79 need for patents, as they can retain tacit
know-how as a form of protection.
Throwing open to patenting the software that is instrumental to the
generativity and end-to-end computing of the Internet raises significant
concerns that a robust patent law must address. Most notably, patent
protection might seem to run counter to the Internet's principal goals of
inclusivity by offering up a right to exclude others from patented software
inventions. This exclusion might impede the incremental advancements in
applications and services characterizing the software industry. In fact, this
worry brings Samuelson, Davis, Kapor, Reichman, and others to argue that
software ought not to be patented. 80
There are a number of ways to tailor patent law to ameliorate this and
other concerns. 8 1 For one thing, patent law ought to require more sufficient
disclosure of patented software inventions. There is systemic inadequate
disclosure in software patents, 82 given that the Federal Circuit seems to
think erroneously that minimal disclosure of software's functionality 8is3
sufficient to enable those skilled in the art to encode the invention.
Disclosure of a software invention's functionality is not enough to ease
incremental development of software. Disclosing actual source code--or at
least detailed flow charts and the like-would more readily contribute to the
database of knowledge of software solutions to various problems.8 4 While
patent protection would prevent the free use of all such disclosed code,
78. Id. (citing Ronald J. Mann, Commercializing Open Source Software: Do Property
Rights Still Matter?, 20 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1, 12, 24-25 (2006)).
79. Id. That said, there might be some political shifts in this regard, as some opensource companies, such as Linux distributor Red Hat, have started to file for patent
protection. Red Hat Patent Policy, http://www.redhat.com/lega/patent-policy.html (last
visited Apr. 18, 2010).
80. Samuelson, Davis, Kapor & Reichman, supra note 64, at 2345-46; Richard M.
Stallman, The Dangers of Software Patents, Address at the University of Dublin, Trinity
College (May 24, 2004), http://www.ifso.ie/documents/rms-2004-05-24.html.
81. Cf Julie E. Cohen & Mark A. Lemley, Patent Scope and Innovation in the Software
Industry, 89 CAL. L. REv. 1, 3 (2001) (arguing that patent law ought to be available to
software inventions, though the law ought to be tailored to these inventions' particular
characteristics).
82. Fromer, supra note 34, at 584; Jeanne C. Fromer, The Layers of Obviousness in
PatentLaw, 22 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 75, 96-97 (2008).
83. E.g., N. Telecom, Inc. v. Datapoint Corp., 908 F.2d 931, 942 (Fed. Cir. 1990)
("'[T]he conversion of a complete thought (as expressed in English and mathematics, i.e. the
known input, the desired output, the mathematical expressions needed and the methods of
using those expressions) into the language a machine understands is necessarily a mere
clerical function to a skilled programmer.'" (alteration in original) (quoting In re Sherwood,
613 F.2d 809, 817 n.6 (C.C.P.A. 1980))).
84. Fromer, supra note 34, at 576 n.160.

2796

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 78

interested parties would have free access in the patent itself to review the
code.
They could then freely appropriate the code's unprotected
components, license code reflecting protected elements, or use the code as a
basis to conceptualize other ways of creating particular software
functionality, thereby avoiding wasteful efforts to reinvent the digital wheel
time and time again.
Moreover, antitrust law and related principles in patent law would have
an important role to play in ensuring that patent law would not operate to
keep would-be competitors out of areas in which software-based standards
have emerged or are emerging on which patents are held.8 5 Relatedly, Julie
Cohen and Mark Lemley suggest a limited right to reverse engineer
patented software inventions in order to study and copy their unprotected
elements, which would help ensure interoperability in a world where
network effects and standards take hold. 86 Had software patents been more
clearly allowed at the Internet's infancy, such legal principles ought to have
prevented the patentability of, or at least the enforceability of patents on, the
87
Internet's basic protocols.
In addition, patent law ought to open up examination and
postexamination to third-party challenges, particularly as to the novelty and
nonobviousness of software inventions. Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., suggests that
there currently may be undetected obviousness in many a patented software
invention, in that the relevant prior art often exists only in other software
code or informal documents, making it nearly impossible for patent
examiners to find and causing patents to issue erroneously. 8 8 For that
reason, allowing third parties to suggest prior-art references relevant to an
invention's novelty and nonobviousness would be helpful to ensure that
software patents issue only for those inventions that are sufficiently
innovative, thereby invigorating competition in the software industry.
Moreover, patent examiners with relevant expertise in software would be
particularly critical to evaluating the effect of this prior art on an invention's
novelty and nonobviousness, as well as how straightforward it was to take
85. See Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Are Business Method Patents Bad for Business?, 16
SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 263, 271-72 (2000); Mark A. Lemley & David
McGowan, Legal Implications of Network Economic Effects, 86 CAL. L. REV. 479, 538-40
(1998).

86. Cohen & Lemley, supra note 81, at 21-26.
87. Cf John R. Allison & Emerson H. Tiller, The Business Method Patent Myth, 18
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 987, 1009 n.60 (2003) (noting that, even if software had been

patentable at the time, the protocols at the heart of the Internet likely would not have been
patented, as many were developed by the government or collaboratively among many
educational institutions).
88. Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., E-Obviousness, 7 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REv. 363

(2001). That said, Allison and Mann demonstrate that, judged by objective factors, such as
the number of prior art references and forward citations, software patents are
indistinguishable--or perhaps stronger-than other patents and these factors hold whether
the patentee is a large company or a small one. John R. Allison & Ronald J. Mann, The
Disputed Quality of Software Patents, 85 WASH. U. L. REv. 297, 298 (2007).
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what was oftentimes a real world business model and encode it in
89
software.
Ensuring the courts' discretion to mold patent law's general requirements
to the specifics and context of any particular software patent would also
help. As one example, Cohen and Lemley propose that because of software
reuse and incremental innovation, infringement liability ought to be
narrowly limited to those cases in which other software falls within the
literal language of the patent's claims, not under patent law's broader
doctrine of equivalents. 90 As another example, district courts have the
discretion whether to enjoin infringers from using a patented invention or
merely to require payments of damages. 9 1 If courts choose just to require
damages, they are effectively awarding a compulsory license to the
infringer: infringe again if you must, but you will have to pay. The more
essential that incremental development is to a particular area of software,
the more courts ought to feel compelled to deny injunctive relief, effectively
implementing a scheme akin to compulsory licensing. Additionally,
damages could decrease as patent duration wears on to reflect the
combination of incremental software innovation and the fast pace of
advancement in the field. Courts should have similar authority to tailor the
novelty, nonobviousness, utility, and disclosure requirements to the
92
particulars of software innovation as it unfolds and the industry evolves.
None of these suggestions is exhaustive; rather, these suggestions are
meant to indicate how the capacious patent law created by Congress can be
tailored to the software industry's specifics, particularly in light of the
Internet's key goals of generativity and end-to-end computing. In that
sense, patent law is not that different from the Internet itself. Patent law
itself is decentralized, in the sense that instantiations of patent law can often
look very different as different firms build up varied patenting practices,
whether through cross-licensing, low patenting rates, or patents as signals
for funding. And patent law is highly generative, in the sense of being
adaptable to the particulars of a myriad of technologies. 93 Patent law
therefore surely has the capacity, if adapted properly, to promote innovation
in Internet software.

89. Dreyfuss, supra note 85, at 278-79; Fromer, supra note 82, at 86-87, 97-98

(discussing how Amazon.com's patent on one-click shopping is likely obvious to software
programmers, while computational-linguistics software frequently is not, even if humans
already speak natural languages fluently).
90. Cohen & Lemley, supra note 81, at 45-53.
91. eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388 (2006).
92. Cf DAN L. BURK & MARK A. LEMLEY, THE PATENT CRISIS AND HOW THE COURTS
CAN SOLVE IT (2009) (suggesting that courts ought to employ their discretion to tailor patent
law to various technologies and industries, depending on their salient characteristics).

93. Id.
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